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Appendix B. Insights from Past 
Experiences with Human Dynamics in 
Military Operations 
Randy Borum 
All military operations have a critical human dimension. Though the 
nature, strength, and focus of human dynamics have varied across time 
and across conflicts, their presence is undeniable. Human dynamics – as 
we have conceptualized them here - comprise the actions and 
interactions of personal, interpersonal, and social/contextual factors 
and their effects on behavioral outcomes.  
Sun Tzu’s ancient strategic admonition to “know your enemy” is 
axiomatic in military history, but historically many military leaders have 
interpreted this narrowly to mean that they should know (or have good 
intelligence preparation about) enemy fighting forces. In discussing 
contemporary military transformations, Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy 
Simmons have observed that the relevant scope of understanding 
should—perhaps must—include also cultural characteristics of the 
adversary: 
Understanding an adversary requires more than intelligence from 
three-letter agencies and satellite photos; it requires an understanding 
of their interests, habits, intentions, beliefs, social organizations, and 
political symbols—in other words, their culture. An American soldier 
can liken culture to a minefield: dangerous ground that, if not 
breached, must be navigated with caution, understanding, and 
respect. Cultural interpretation, competence, and adaptation are 
prerequisites for achieving a win-win relationship in any military 
operation. Operational commanders who do not consider the role of 
culture during mission planning and execution invite unintended and 
unforeseen consequences, and even mission failure.1 
                                                
1 Basilici, Steven P. & Simmons, Jeremy (June, 2004). Transformation: a bold case for 
unconventional warfare. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. p. 6 
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For the military commander, however, understanding and mastering 
the human dimension of warfare—and Sun Tzu would probably 
agree—requires not only understanding these things about an “enemy,” 
but also about the entire battlespace.  
In his analysis of military leadership in the British Civil Wars, 
military historian Stanley D.M. Carpenter emphasizes the importance of 
an operation’s “social context” and how this affects, and is affected by, 
force of human dynamics: 
Human dynamics encompass what Clausewitz called the ‘moral 
forces’ and include fear, motivation, passion, the urge to flee, hate, 
loyalty, and so on. A successful leader, through his inherent traits and 
behaviors, is able to overcome (or at least moderate) the negative 
aspects of human dynamics and conversely take advantage of the 
positive. In this regard, one can if not overcome, at least mitigate 
what Clausewitz popularized as the ‘fog and friction of war’. It allows 
him to better manage the inherent chaos and uncertainty of combat. 
The societal context plays a large part in a military leader’s success or 
failure. It often determines the quality of the instrument and certainly 
influences the depth of such human dynamics as motivation, passion, 
willingness to sacrifice and so forth. As with the human dynamics, it 
is how the commander, through his traits and behavior, manages the 
societal context that will determine his effectiveness.2 
These pervasive human dynamics can be better understood to 
shape tactics and strategy. Indeed, the essence of strategy is to develop 
a plan of action that is likely to achieve a specific objective in light of an 
opponent’s anticipated response. Anticipating responses - of an enemy, 
population, or social institution - has been a central dilemma of every 
military leader throughout history.  
Some scholars of military strategy and history have suggested that, 
for the United States, strategy has been a core weakness. Colin Gray 
suggests that “The United States has a persisting strategy deficit. 
Americans are very competent at fighting, but they are much less 
successful in fighting in such a way that they secure the strategic and, 
hence, political, rewards they seek.”  It seems that the United States’ 
                                                
2. Carpenter, S. (2005). Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651: The Genius of 
This Age. NY: Routledge. at p. 5 
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past experiences with human dynamics in military operation illustrates 
the maxim that one can “win the battle (perhaps even all the battles) 
but lose the war.”   
Ideally, strategic competence evolves with experience. According to 
Gray, historical examination of past conflicts– of the U.S. and others – 
can help to redefine and improve the “American Way of Warfare”; but 
he laments, “unfortunately, the first and truest love of the U.S. defense 
community is with technology, not with history.”  Gray’s comments 
about the present parallel Ralph Peters’ future-oriented analysis that 
“We need to struggle against our American tendency to focus on 
hardware and bean counting to attack the more difficult and subtle 
problems posed by human behavior and regional history.” 
History may lend its wisdom to understanding the role of human 
dynamics in military operations, but it certainly does not offer a menu 
of easy answers. Naval historian Geoffrey Till points out, however, that 
“The chief utility of history for the analysis of present and future lies in 
its ability, not to point out lessons, but to isolate things that need 
thinking about. … History provides insights and questions, not 
answers.3”  In that spirit, the following insights from past experience 
are offered for consideration: 
1. Cultural Awareness Facilitates Strategic and 
Tactical Success  
Examples of human dynamics affecting military operations are 
abundant – though largely anecdotal- and range from the micro to 
macro levels.  
At the broadest, strategic level, Robert Jervis4 suggest that lack of 
cultural awareness is a major source of misperceptions between 
nation/states (particularly as noted in the 1970s, between the United 
                                                
3. Till, Geoffrey. Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, London: Macmillan, 1982, pp. 224-
225. 
4. Jervis, Robert. “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968), 
p 454-479. Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). 
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States and the Soviet Union), and that these misperceived intentions 
can have far-reaching consequences. He rejects the more politically-
oriented spiral and deterrence theories as explanations for Cold War 
escalations, and instead focuses on “psychological dynamics” as a 
source of cognitive bias that, unchecked, will create and sustain 
misperceptions. Those misperceptions form the basis for a state’s 
decisions and subsequent actions. 
Cooper and Telfer have analyzed the cultural impediments to 
effective relations and communication between the U.S. and Iran. They 
claim that these impediments create an environment that is not 
conducive to resolving its mutual, critical problems. They believe “the 
tragedy is that relations will deteriorate because the two nations, 
through a marked trend of political and strategic misperceptions, will be 
operating with false models of the political systems and organization of 
the other, leading to a state of confusion exacerbated by mutual 
incomprehension of each other’s culture.” 5 
At the ground level, among the most common examples for the 
U.S. military are foibles and missteps arising from a lack of cultural 
awareness. Arcuri (2007) provides a concise description of the problem 
and the call for a solution: 
Few members of the Armed Forces are familiar with cultural 
traditions of the countries in which they operate. Yet violation of 
local norms and beliefs can turn a welcoming population into a 
hostile mob. Iraqis arrested by U.S. troops have had their heads 
forced to the ground -- a position forbidden by Islam except during 
prayers. This action offends detainees as well as bystanders. In 
Bosnia, American soldiers angered Serbs by greeting them with the 
two-fingered peace sign, a gesture commonly used by their Croat 
enemies. And the circled-finger “A–OK” signal was a gross insult to 
Somalis. The military has enough to worry about without alienating 
the local population. It is clear that the Armed Forces lack 
sophisticated knowledge of foreign countries. That does not 
dishonor their performance; cultural awareness has not been a 
mission-essential task—but it should be.  
                                                
5. Cooper, A. & Telfer, L. (Summer 2006). Misperceptions and Impediments in the US-Iran 
Relationship. 49th Parallel:  An Interdisciplinary Journal of North American Studies, 
Conference Special Edition. P. 27 
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These cultural violations seem to have the most significant impact 
in operations that require engagement with a host population and that 
support stability or humanitarian assistance activity. One insight from 
these experiences seems to be the need to define the “battlespace,” 
terrain, or area of operation, not just by physical or geographic 
boundaries, but also by culture. This means that service members must 
not only train to “know the enemy,” but to “know the area.”  Most of 
Arcuri’s examples are not mistakes in anticipating an enemy maneuver, 
they are social/cultural mistakes that carried the potential not only to 
anger and embolden the adversary, but also to cultivate broad hostility 
among the population toward U.S. presence and personnel. That 
hostility could then complicate current mission objectives and future 
operational planning.  
The examples do illustrate, however, that the effects of cultural 
awareness (or lack thereof) can be expected to influence mission 
effectiveness even at the most minute and incidental tactical level. This 
does not mean that each soldier, sailor, airman, and marine must be an 
expert in the area of operation, but basic cultural awareness should be a 
fundamental skill for all troops operating in a foreign environment.  
2. It is Necessary to Understand and Accept that 
Military Operations Have Political Objectives 
and Effects   
War and politics are inextricably linked. This principle is found in 
most theories of warfare and evidence of its truth has been found in 
virtually every known military conflict. Clausewitz – the deeply 
influential Prussian military theorist – said starkly that “war is a 
continuation of politics with other means."   Chairman Mao Tse-Tung 
commented similarly on the relationship, claiming:  “Politics is war 
without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.” 
While the confluence of politics and war may seem an obvious 
point, it is not one that many American policy-makers seem ready to 
accept. Jeffrey Record observes that “Permeating the entire fabric of 
America’s strategic culture and approach to war, especially the aversion 
to fighting for limited political purposes, is an unwillingness to accept 
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war as a continuation of politics.” 6  Record further opines that “This 
insistence on politically immaculate military operations underpins the 
conventional wisdom in the United States regarding the failed 
prosecution of the Vietnam War.”  When nations oppose nations with 
conventional force, the power of political will and popular support 
favor the U.S., but when the America becomes involved in “small 
wars,” foreign insurgencies, and humanitarian intervention, - what many 
see as the future of warfare - the “political” objectives become less 
palatable, though operationally essential.  
Historically, when a third-party nation has stepped in to help 
suppress an insurgency, the “successful” cases nearly always involve 
important political concessions (to the insurgents’ interest) by the 
indigenous government. Concessions were designed specifically to 
address insurgent grievances and offered even when the 
counterinsurgency was not favoring the indigenous government. In the 
Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1960), for example, concessions were made 
for land reform and voting rights. During The Malayan Emergency 
(1948-60) the government critically conceded freedom from British 
rule, voting rights, and actions to relieve the effects of long-term 
bigotry on the ethnic Chinese population.  
Making concessions can be difficult to “sell” politically to the 
people of an intervening government. These concessions, however, 
were not intended as a form of surrender or a sign of weakness, but 
rather as an essential way to dry up popular support for the insurgents. 
They were apparently effective for that purpose. Because political 
factors are so important for the success of military operations, the 
population not just the enemy becomes a vital concern.  
                                                
6. Record, Jeffrey. September 1, 2006. “The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to 
Successful Counterinsurgency,” Cato Institute Paper, no. 577; 1-20. p. 5 
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3. Populations Matter As Much As (Sometimes 
More Than) Fighting Forces in Determining 
Military Success 
Historically, during conventional wars there has been a dominant—
in some cases, nearly exclusive—focus on understanding and 
countering enemy military forces. What has been lost is the critical 
importance of understanding and influencing the population. As the 
U.S. has become increasingly involved in “small wars” and various 
forms of irregular warfare around the globe, the essential role of a 
population in military operations—though known for centuries—has 
again come more sharply into view.  
In the early 1800s, Napoleon Bonaparte, an imposing conventional 
warrior and military strategist, failed to understand—or even seek to 
understand—the culture of the battlespace as he preemptively invaded 
Spain and Portugal. With ease, his occupying military forces strode into 
the region and dethroned the royal family. His victory seemed effortless 
and complete.  
Napoleon anticipated and conquered the formal state governing 
structure, but he failed to learn in advance how little control that 
authority held over large segments of its populace. Residents of the 
Navarre region, in particular, had become heavily dependent 
economically on illicit foreign trade and had a great deal to lose from 
the prospect of a new foreign governance. They also were more deeply 
bound to the influences of the Catholic Church, than Napoleon 
realized. According to Chandler, the confluence of forces cultivated 
within the population—foreseeable, but unforeseen—“popular 
patriotism, religious fanaticism, and an almost hysterical hatred for the 
French7.”  That dynamic transformed Napoleon’s graceful occupation 
into a protracted eight-year, resource-consuming struggle.  
According to Smith: “The strategic gap that developed between 
Napoleon’s rapid conventional military victory and the immediate 
                                                
7. Chandler, David G. (1966). The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 
659. 
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requirement to influence positively the population as part of post-
hostilities stabilization operations highlights the limits of conventional 
military power in post-conflict operations and the perils of forgetting 
“the people” in the initial and ongoing strategic calculus. Unfortunately, 
nations and militaries around the globe have been forced to relearn that 
lesson many times in the ensuing 200 years.”8  
Accounting, as Smith says, for “the people” in initial and ongoing 
strategic planning requires understanding and anticipating their role 
both in resistance and in resolution. One of the longstanding maxims of 
counterinsurgency strategy is to separate the population from the 
insurgents. This is done to increase physical and informational control; 
to stem the tide of insurgent growth and recruitment by denying them 
access; to permit kinetic action against insurgents that occurs “out of 
view” of the populace and reduces risk of collateral injuries; and to 
increase the population’s sense of security, at least within their “safe 
zones.”  Andrew F. Krepinevich suggests that neglecting this separation 
principle was a major downfall in the United States’ military action in 
Vietnam. He concludes that superior U.S. firepower facilitated massive 
Viet Cong attrition, but “it never denied the enemy his source of 
strength - access to the people.”9 
When insurgents have easy access to, and are hopelessly co-mingled 
with, the population, it is easier for them to control the “narrative” of 
what is happening. When the insurgent view becomes ground truth for 
the population, the resistance not only gains new fighters, but just as 
importantly, it gains a broader base of sympathizers. A population of 
sympathizers is perhaps the most powerful force multiplier for 
insurgents.  
During World War II, as part of the People's Liberation War of 
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavian Partisans enjoyed tremendous growth and 
success (culminating in over three quarters of a million fighting 
                                                
8. Smith, George. 2004. Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural 
Intelligence. CJCS Strategy Essay Competition. Washington D.C: National Defense University 
Press. P. 22 
9. Krepinevich, Andrew (1986). The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
Press. P. 197. 
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troops)—according to an embedded former OSS officer Franklin 
Lindsay—largely as a function of a friendly population. Franklin says of 
the populace that “Their support was crucial to success. They provided 
the intelligence screens that surrounded and protected the armed 
Partisans, as well as the food and clothing, the shelter and the recruits, 
without which the Partisans could not survive10.”  T.E Lawrence 
similarly noted that “Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a 
striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic.”11  
4. Continuity of Knowledge on Human 
Dynamics is Essential, Particularly in 
Joint/Coalition and Protracted Operations.  
During the U.S. “RESTORE HOPE” operations in Somalia (UN 
Operation in Somalia, UNOSUM I), the first Joint Force Commander 
recognized the grave operational implications of the region’s “clan 
warfare” culture and tasked the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to 
monitor not only adversary intent, but also the “disposition” of the 
population. A Joint Universal “lessons learned” analysis says of the 
Somalis that “their culture stresses the idea of ‘me and my clan against 
all outsiders,’ with alliances between clans being only temporary 
conveniences. Guns and aggressiveness, including the willingness to 
accept casualties, are intrinsic parts of this culture, with women and 
children considered part of the clan’s order of battle.”12   
These issues proved to be vital for operational planning. 
Unfortunately, the cultural lessons devolved over time and across 
changes in personnel to the extent that “during UNOSOM II, US 
leaders failed to take certain factors of Somali culture into 
consideration, contributing to the operation’s failure.”13 As Kent 
                                                
10. Lindsay, Franklin (1993). Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisan's in Wartime 
Yugoslavia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 198. 
11. Quoted in Laqueur, W. (Ed.). (2004). Voices of terror: Manifestos, writings and manuals of Al 
Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorists from around the world and throughout the ages. New York: Reed Press. 
12. Allard, Kenneth (1995). Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington DC: National 
Defense University Press. p. 13. 
13. U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 September 2002), III-10. 
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Strader observes: “Somewhere in the transfer of authority (TOA) 
between UNOSUM I and II knowledge was lost or ignored.” 14  
The “lessons learned” analysis concludes that “The Somalia 
experience underlines the importance of knowing the country, the 
culture, the ground, and the language as a pre-condition for military 
operations15,” but an embedded insight is that continuity of knowledge 
is important. Senior command certainly must understand the cultural 
and other human dynamics of the battlespace, but the responsibility for 
this knowledge cannot be relegated solely to the operational 
Commander16. As experiences in Iraq show, even brigade-level leaders 
must ensure that human dynamics intelligence has continuity through 
the transfer of authority. Brigades and their units frequently experience 
deployment rotations or geographic displacements. What is learned 
about the battlespace in one area or on one deployment may not apply 
when the same unit moves just thirty miles away. It is critical that area-
specific knowledge not only be collected and used, but also shared and 
preserved through changes in personnel.  
5. Human Dynamics Are Fluid and Often 
Variable Across and Within Conflicts or 
Operations 
Past experiences suggest that human dynamics largely shape the 
disposition of a population and the character of conflict. In his book, 
Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, John Lynn argues that all warfare 
is, and has been, culture-specific. He suggests that since Ancient Greek 
times, dynamics of human values, expectations and preconceptions– 
cultural (a term he uses to refer to a complex that is somewhat more 
idiosyncratic than nomothetic) dynamics in particular – have been the 
                                                
14. Strader, O. Kent (2006). Culture: The New Key Terrain  - Integrating Cultural Competence 
into JIPB. School of Advanced Military Studies , United States Army Command and General 
Staff College , Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. p. 27 
15. Ibid, p. 95 
16. Gordon, James A. (2004). Cultural Assessments and Campaign Planning:  A Monograph. School of 
Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. 
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principal driver of whether and how nations have engaged in armed 
conflict.17 While Lynn’s argument is somewhat polemic, he provides 
extensive examples to support his view from conflicts and eras 
throughout military history. He concludes that human dynamics 
influences have been not only robust in warfare, but that the dynamics 
and their effects varied with the culture of the conflict’s participants. 
In his landmark analysis of the Vietnam War, Douglas Pike reaches 
a similar conclusion:  that unconventional warfare does not lend itself 
to a grand theory. Each conflict or operation possesses a unique set of 
causes and sustaining or driving factors. One size – or one 
understanding - does not fit all.  Pike concludes that “Unconventional 
wars grow because of the peculiar political soil of individual cultures18.”  
If this is true, then according to Kent Strader, a key to success for the 
operational commander will be “to unravel the cause of conflict and 
attack its origins with non-kinetic tools and to a lesser degree its 
soldiers.19   
Past military experience does not indicate that no human dynamics 
are persistent or enduring, only that many are unique and/or variable 
both across and even within a given operation. It is reasonable to infer 
that certain core dynamics are recurrent across most conflicts. 
However, even the core dynamics, which are relatively stable, are 
transformative. That is, the core dynamic may persist, but its 
manifestations may be different depending on contextual influences, 
and they change over the developmental course of the operation.  
One of the predominant core dynamics influencing a population is 
its perceived safety and security. Perhaps this principle is not surprising. 
It has been a cornerstone of behavioral theories of motivation for more 
than half a century. Nearly every college student has been exposed to 
                                                
17. Lynn,  John (2003). Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to 
Modern America. New York: Westview Press. 
18. Pike, Douglas (1986). PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam, Novato, CA: Presidio Press.  
p. 54. 
19. Strader, O. Kent (2006). Culture: The New Key Terrain  - Integrating Cultural Competence 
into JIPB. School of Advanced Military Studies , United States Army Command and General 
Staff College , Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. p. 25 
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Abraham Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs,” in which safety/security is 
just one motivational notch above a human’s physiological needs for 
food, sleep, etc20. In nearly all known military operations, securing the 
population’s sense of safety has been a necessary (though not always 
sufficient) condition for any successful campaign to win its “hearts and 
minds.”  People feel safer living in an environment that they perceive as 
orderly, predictable, and fair. When an occupying military can provide 
that environment for the population, the loyalty of the people often 
follows. Without it, however, it has faltered. 
Though a population’s sense of security is a robust contributor to 
operational success, its manifestations are transformative, and therefore, 
fluid. In past military conflicts, the nature and object of safety concerns 
has evolved over time. A population may begin by fearing threats from 
a repressive government, but over time becomes more concerned about 
protection against accidental and intentional harm from insurgents who 
are resisting an occupying force. Likewise, in human terrain relief 
operations and stability operations, safety needs may shift from an 
initial focus on protection against tribal or sectarian violence to 
protection against disease and health concerns—or vice versa. The 
same “dynamic” or need is manifested in a different form and may 
require a different military response. That even the “stable” dynamics 
are fluid means—consistent with the “continuity” insight—that 
monitoring the disposition of the population must be ongoing and 
continuous.  
Finally, it is striking how the influence of human dynamics in 
military operations can vary widely even within a given conflict or within 
the battlespace. This insight has been dramatically evident throughout 
recent U.S. experiences in Iraq. David Kilcullen – the U.S.’s senior 
counterinsurgency strategy advisor – based on personal experiences and 
observation notes that “Knowledge of Iraq is very time-specific and 
location-specific….Hence, observations from one time/place may or 
may not be applicable elsewhere, even in the same campaign in the 
same year: we must first understand the essentials of the environment, 
                                                
20. Maslow, A.H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological Review 50, 370-96. 
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then determine whether analogous situations exist, before attempting to 
apply “lessons.”21  
This has serious implications for the depth and frequency of 
intelligence assessments, within-theatre information sharing, and the 
aforementioned continuity and transfer of knowledge.  
 
 
                                                
21. Kilcullen, David (2007). Counterinsurgency in Iraq:  Theory and Practice, 2007.  
